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THE LESSONS OF 1919
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr.*
ONE hundred years ago, the Supreme Court embarked on its firstserious consideration of the First Amendment’s guarantee offreedom of speech. In 1919, the Court upheld four federal crimi-
nal convictions over First Amendment defenses. Three of the majority
opinions were written by Justice Holmes. In the fourth, he offered a clas-
sic dissent. Two of the cases, Frohwerk v. United States1 and Debs v.
United States,2 are of middling significance. The other two, Schenck v.
United States3 and Abrams v. United States,4 are iconic. From these cases
have sprung an expansive and complex jurisprudence of free speech.
Most law school courses begin consideration of freedom of speech with
discussion of the Schenck and Abrams opinions, deservedly so since they
have much to teach us. Justice Holmes’s majority opinion in Schenck as
well as his dissent in Abrams, at least on the First Amendment issue, are
written in classic Holmes style—short, cryptic, and ambiguous—resulting
in 100 years of explication and debate. What lessons do these classic cases
teach?
First, a little background is warranted. Schenck was convicted under
the Espionage Act of 1917 for “causing and attempting to cause insubor-
dination, &c, in the military and naval forces of the United States, and to
obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, when
the United States was at war.”5 Schenck’s conduct, which seems quite
harmless and easily protected by present day standards, consisted of
printing and distributing pamphlets quoting the Thirteenth Amendment
and proclaiming “Assert Your Rights” and “Do not submit to intimida-
tion.”6 Schenck was convicted and the Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction in one of its first significant First Amendment opinions.
Abrams was convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended
in 1918.7 Unlike the language of the Act under which Schenck was con-
victed, focusing exclusively on the impact of the conduct or speech, for
* Larry and Jane Harlan Senior Research Fellow and Professor of Law at Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
1. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
2. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
3. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
4. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). For two excellent and very useful books written about the
Abrams case, see RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS (1987) and THOMAS HEALY,
THE GREAT DISSENT (2013).
5. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–49.
6. Id. at 51.
7. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616–17.
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example, interference with the draft, the sections of the amended Act
that tripped up the Abrams defendants focused particularly on the con-
tent of their speech. The defendants, who were committed anarchists,
were convicted under a statute that made it a crime,
[w]hen the United States was at war . . . , to unlawfully utter, print,
write and publish . . . ‘disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about
the form of government of the United States;’ . . . language ‘intended
to bring the form of Government of the United States into contempt,
scorn, contumely, and disrepute;’ and . . . language ‘intended to in-
cite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in said
war.’8
In addition, they were charged with conspiring “to urge, incite and advo-
cate curtailment of production of . . . ordnance and ammunition, neces-
sary and essential to the prosecution of the war.”9 The defendants
engaged in these violations by distributing flyers, some in English and
some in Yiddish, objecting to United States interference with the devel-
oping Russian revolution by sending troops to Russia. Among other
things, the flyers urged “Workers of the World! Awake! Rise! Put down
your enemy and mine!”; “Workers in the ammunition factories, you are
producing bullets, bayonets, cannon, to murder not only the Germans,
but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for free-
dom”; and “In order to save the Russian revolution, we must keep the
armies of the allied countries busy at home.”10 There was more of the
same but nothing that would lead to an indictment, much less a convic-
tion, today. Still, the defendants were convicted, and the Supreme Court
sustained the conviction over Justice Holmes’s classic dissent. Most of the
majority opinion as well as the Holmes dissent focused not on the free
speech issue but rather on whether the government had established its
case under the statute given that the defendants were primarily con-
cerned with halting U.S. interference with the Russian revolution and
only tangentially with the impact on the U.S. war effort against Germany.
Near the end, Holmes wrote two short paragraphs addressing the First
Amendment defense and explaining why freedom of speech was worth
protecting even in challenging circumstances.11
So why are the Schenck and Abrams opinions so important and what
do they tell us about the First Amendment?
Characteristic of a Holmes opinion, Schenck is brief yet memorable.
Holmes recognized at the outset in Schenck that speech is capable of
causing serious harm.12 To the extent that speech is worthy of serious
protection, it is in spite of the harm that it may inflict.13 That insight has
continued to resonate throughout free speech jurisprudence. Because of
8. Id. at 617.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 620–22 (italics omitted).
11. Id. at 629–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
13. Id.
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the harm that speech can cause, despite the text of the First Amendment,
protection is not absolute. Rather, it is contextual. Holmes noted that
whether speech is protected will depend on “the circumstances.”14 In
Schenck, the fact that the nation was at war was crucial.15 Without be-
coming doctrinaire, Holmes recognized that at least in some cases, the
interest in free speech must be balanced against competing public inter-
ests.16 The Schenck opinion is simply the Court’s initial attempt at the
creation of free speech jurisprudence.17 Courts and scholars would spend
the next 100 years debating as to how the balance between free speech
and important public interest should be struck. Holmes recognized that
there needed to be a balance.
At the outset, Holmes did attempt to resolve one significant doctrinal
issue suggesting that, contrary to his own dicta in the prior case of Patter-
son v. Colorado,18 the protection of the First Amendment might not be
limited to a prohibition against prior restraints against publication. In his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone had con-
cluded that the common law merely prohibited prior restraints on speech
and did not interfere with subsequent punishment.19 Some had argued
that the framers of the First Amendment had intended to incorporate this
principle considering how influential Blackstone’s treatise was with the
framing generation.20 As noted, Holmes had flirted with the Blackstonian
approach in Patterson but somewhat cavalierly cast it aside in Schenck.21
From that point onward, it would be accepted that the First Amendment
applied to attempts to punish speech once it had seen the light of day.
Had Schenck done nothing else, that would have been an important
achievement although it occurred most casually and in a case rejecting
the First Amendment claim.
Assuming that speech is important and is constitutionally protected but
that the protection is not absolute and sometimes must yield to compet-
ing considerations, the question became how should the Court determine
whether speech or the competing governmental interest should prevail?




17. The Court had dealt with free speech issues incidentally or tangentially in prior
opinions but not to an extent that would create freedom of speech doctrine. See DAVID M.
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997), for a detailed study of the devel-
opment of a free speech culture prior to 1919.
18. 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 151 (Rees
Welsh & Co. 1898) (1769).
20. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1941)
(“This Blackstonian theory dies hard but it ought to be knocked on its head once and for
all.”); RABBAN, supra note 17, at 131–34 (prior to the World War I cases, many courts
adopted the Blackstonian approach but not all).
21. Chafee had argued against the Blackstonian approach. See Zechariah Chafee Jr.,
Freedom of Speech, 17 NEW REPUBLIC 66 (1918); see also Zechariah Chafee Jr., Freedom
of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 939 (1919).
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test adopted from English law.22 That is, the government had the right to
prohibit and punish speech which might have a tendency to cause conduct
which the government had the right to prevent, such as interference with
the war effort. In Schenck, Holmes seemed to deviate from that approach
by declaring that the government may prohibit speech that poses a “clear
and present danger” to interests that it has the right to protect.23 Clear
and present danger sounds significantly more demanding than “bad ten-
dency.” And yet it is far from clear that Holmes intended to substitute a
more rigorous legal standard.24 To begin with, Holmes did not like for-
malistic bright line rules, so it seems inconsistent with his jurisprudential
approach to assume that he intended to create one. Second, it would
seem unlikely that any other Justice on the Court, much less a majority,
would agree with a such a significant change. Third, on turning to the case
before the Court, Holmes seemed to fall back on the bad tendency ap-
proach. He wrote, “If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its ten-
dency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no
ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”25
Fourth, if the Court was indeed substituting a more speech protective
standard for the bad tendency test, then presumably Schenck would be
entitled to a new trial under the proper standard, unless the Court also
concluded that it was clear from the record that he would have been con-
victed under that standard as well.26 Finally, in the other speech cases
decided in 1919, in two of which Holmes wrote the majority opinion af-
firming the convictions, the Court appeared to apply the bad tendency
approach. At least it made no mention of clear and present danger.
Whether or not intended as a legal test, clear and present danger
seemed to resonate. This may be at least partially attributed to Zechariah
Chafee’s relentless efforts to portray clear and present danger as more
speech protective than it was or had been intended by Holmes.27 Eventu-
ally, it was applied by the Court as a standard for judging whether sedi-
tious speech could be criminally punished.28 Given the iconic nature of
the Holmes opinion, clear and present danger became known to the gen-
eral public as well. The highly inaccurate perception was created among
the general public that all free speech issues could be resolved by deter-
22. RABBAN, supra note 17, at 118–19, 134–35; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES
171 (2004) (“[T]he ‘bad tendency’ approach was embraced by almost every federal court
that interpreted and applied the Espionage Act during World War I.”).
23. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
24. David Rabban argues that clear and present danger was no different for Holmes
than bad tendency. RABBAN, supra note 17, at 248, 282, 285, 293; see also STONE, supra
note 22, at 195.
25. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (citing Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474, 477
(1918)).
26. STONE, supra note 22, at 195.
27. See RABBAN, supra note 17, at 318, 323–325, 333–335, 342–55, for the argument
that Chafee deliberately misinterpreted clear and present danger to provide a more speech
protective approach than Holmes intended.
28. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court applied a diluted version
of the test to activities of the leadership of the American Communist Party. Id. at 507.
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mining whether the speech in issue created a clear and present danger.
Regardless of the precise legal status of clear and present danger, it cer-
tainly indicates that similar to bad tendency, the focus of inquiry should
be on the potential impact of the speech as opposed to the precise lan-
guage or the speaker’s intent. As is well known, Holmes and his young
friend Federal District Judge Learned Hand argued as to whether the
Holmes impact-based approach was superior to the language-focused ap-
proach developed by Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patton.29 Fifty
years in the future, the Supreme Court would combine the two into a
highly protective standard for evaluating seditious speech in Brandenburg
v. Ohio30 considering both inciting language and the imminence of harm.
When Holmes wrote the phrase “clear and present danger” he un-
leashed a formulaic concept into the legal world which would have far
greater impact than we may assume Holmes ever intended.31 Schenck,
through a concise and ambiguous opinion, provided an object lesson that
judges need to be extraordinarily cautious as to what they write in opin-
ions since lawyers and legal scholars will scour through them in search of
any usable scrap of language.
Even more iconic than clear and present danger is Holmes’s often re-
peated, and much criticized, analogy to “falsely shouting fire in a theater
and causing a panic.”32 The line is often misquoted with the omission of
“falsely” and the insertion of “crowded” before theater.33 This example
clearly resonated in the public imagination, however, like so much that
Holmes wrote, it is less than clear what this colorful image established.
Holmes presumably used this example to illustrate that (1) freedom of
speech was not absolute, (2) speech could cause serious harm, and (3)
context mattered. All of these are points that Holmes had made earlier in
the opinion. As a matter of rhetoric, this example, perhaps inspired some-
29. 244 F. 535, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). For a discussion of the Holmes/Hand discussions,
see GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND 162–70 (1994) and Gerald Gunther, Learned
Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History,
27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975). Their conversations are also recounted in HEALY, supra note
4, at 15–27, and STONE, supra note 22, at 201–203.
30. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
31. See Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Dennis objecting to formulaic reli-
ance on clear and present and observing that “[i]t does an ill service to the author of the
most quoted judicial phrases regarding freedom of speech, to make him the victim of a
tendency which he fought all his life, whereby phrases are made to do service for critical
analysis by being turned into dogma.” Dennis, 341 U.S. at 543 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Holmes apparently came across
the fire in a theater example in reviewing closing argument of the prosecution in the Debs
trial. See HEALY, supra note 4, at 91, 97. See, for example, ALAN DERSHOWITZ, TAKING
THE STAND (2015), for criticism of the statement noting that falsely shouting fire is akin to
maliciously setting off a fire alarm in the absence of a fire. Ernst Freund was also highly
critical of the fire in the theater image at the time in his critique of the Holmes opinion in
“The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech.” See generally Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and
Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919, at 13, reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 239
(1973). See also HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION 133–34 (1988), for criticism of
the fire in the theater analogy.
33. See Vincent Blasi, Shouting Fire in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP.
U. L. REV. 535, 560 (2011).
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what by recent events, illustrated these points in a manner quite accessi-
ble to the reader.34 The example humanized the legal analysis but
perhaps at the expense of suggesting that the example was a legal test,
which it clearly was not intended to be. Perhaps the key to the statement
is the word “falsely,” which seems to assume malice on the part of the
speaker, arguably a dangerous concept to inject into free speech analysis.
As far as the example goes, shouting fire in a theater, when such a fire
actually exists, would presumably be protected, although it might lead to
a panic resulting in serious harm and even death. Perhaps not too much
should be made of the comment since it may have been merely intended
as a throwaway line as Holmes was thinking out loud, or rather, on paper.
Because of the Holmes mystique, these two phrases have assumed a life
of their own.
After his brief one paragraph discussion of the First Amendment,
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the conviction.35
Holmes made no serious attempt to apply either the clear and present
danger or bad tendency approach to the facts. He never explained why
Schenck’s speech would present a threat to military recruiting or the war
effort. It was as if the discussion of freedom of speech was nothing more
than window dressing. And though Holmes seemed to suggest that free-
dom of speech was important, he made no attempt to explain why. Based
on Schenck alone, the Holmes foray into free speech might have been
forgotten, although it did provoke some response and criticism from
those who hoped for more and better from the iconic Justice.36
Before moving on to Abrams, a few words on Frohwerk and Debs are
in order. Both opinions were published a week after Schenck. In
Frohwerk, Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld a conviction
under the Espionage Act of 1917 based on the publication of a series of
articles denouncing the U.S. war effort, criticizing the draft, and sympa-
thizing with Germany.37 As with Schenck, Holmes acknowledged that all
of the statements might have been protected during peacetime. But like
Schenck, Holmes emphasized that First Amendment analysis was contex-
tual not absolute. Like the fire/theater example in Schenck, Holmes
noted in Frohwerk that no one including Hamilton or Madison would
have “ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder
. . . would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech.”38 In view
of the inadequate record before the Court, Holmes concluded that “it is
impossible to say that it might not have been found that the circulation of
the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle
34. Id. at 562. Blasi suggests that Holmes used this as an example of speech that would
be unprotected “by virtue of its subject matter, intention, and function [having] nothing to
do with the evolution of ideas.” Id. at 567.
35. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
36. See HEALY, supra note 4, at 108–114, for a discussion of the contemporaneous
criticism of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs.
37. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 252 (1919).
38. Id. at 206.
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a flame . . . .”39 Although Holmes cited Schenck with some frequency in
the Frohwerk opinion, there was no mention of clear and present danger.
Frohwerk suggests that clear and present danger in Schenck was nothing
more than loose dicta and bad tendency was still the dominant approach.
The deference that the Court showed to the government in a free speech
case is jarring to modern sensibilities.
Debs is interesting given that it affirmed the conviction of a sometime
presidential candidate also pursuant to the Espionage Act of 1917 for
inciting insubordination with respect to military duty and for obstructing
and intending to obstruct recruiting.40 Both charges were based on a
speech that Debs had delivered in Canton, Ohio. Again, Holmes wrote a
brief opinion for a unanimous Court. After quoting at length from the
speech, Holmes declared with virtually no legal analysis that the properly
instructed jury could have found that Debs’s speech constituted violations
of the Act.41 As with Frohwerk, there was no mention of clear and pre-
sent danger. Indeed, there was nothing in the Holmes opinion to suggest
that important constitutional rights were at stake.
That brings us to Abrams v. United States. Abrams is different from the
other cases in several respects. First, as noted above, Abrams was in-
dicted under the 1918 amendments to the 1917 Act which focused specifi-
cally on the language of the defendant rather than the effect. The law
essentially punished seditious speech similar to the infamous Sedition Act
of 1798 passed and enforced during the Adams Administration. Second,
although Abrams, like the three previous cases, was decided in 1919, it
was part of the 1919–1920 Court Term while the others were part of the
1918–1919 Term. Finally, and most importantly, Justice Holmes dissented
in Abrams while writing the majority opinions in the other three cases.
Abrams is a First Amendment classic but only for the final paragraph of
the Holmes dissent, in which for the first time a Justice attempted to ex-
plain why the First Amendment mattered.
Most of the majority opinion as well as the Holmes dissent focused on
whether the jury could have decided that the defendants had the proper
intent to support a criminal conspiracy to violate the statute. The problem
was that they were protesting the wrong war. The indictments were aimed
at seditious speech that interfered with the American war effort with
Germany. The defendants were protesting American interference in the
Russian Revolution. The government’s theory accepted by the majority
was that attempting to curtail American interference in the Russian
Revolution would necessarily undermine the war effort against Germany.
As the Court put it, “Men must be held to have intended . . . the effects
which their acts were likely to produce.”42 Holmes would have required
specific intent to interfere with the war effort against Germany rather
39. Id. at 209.
40. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
41. Id.
42. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 621 (1919).
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than the indirect intent that satisfied the majority. But if that was all there
was to it, Abrams would be a forgotten case.
Turning to the First Amendment argument, Holmes noted that he had
no doubt that the decisions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were cor-
rect.43 He then announced that the appropriate standard under the First
Amendment was “clear and imminent danger” or “an intent to bring it
about.”44 He declared that there was no possibility that the defendant’s
conduct could satisfy that standard.45
Then, however, in one final paragraph Holmes attempted to explain
theoretically why the protection of free speech was important. Most sig-
nificantly, as justification for the protection of freedom of speech,
Holmes introduced the marketplace of ideas/search for truth justification,
which remains one of the primary theories for vigorous First Amendment
protection. The often-quoted sentence in the opinion reads:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas–that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.46
As with so many of Holmes’s classic statements, this sentence is packed
with ambiguity. Was Holmes suggesting that there was absolute truth
which would eventually prevail in the competition of the market, or was
he taking the far more relativistic position that whatever prevails at any
given time by definition is truth?47 The former seems more reassuring,
however, given Holmes’s skepticism, it isn’t clear that is what he meant.
Holmes did not create the search for truth justification from whole cloth.
It may be traced at least back to John Milton’s Areopagitica in 1644,48 and
the theory was expounded and popularized by John Stuart Mill in Chap-
ter 2 of his book On Liberty published in 1859.49 Though Holmes cited
neither, as a very learned and well-read individual, it is certain that he
43. Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 627–28. Rabban argues that Holmes adopted Chafee’s misinterpretation of
clear and present danger as being more speech protective than it was intended. RABBAN,
supra note 17, at 343, 354.
45. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 630.
47. Holmes biographer G. Edward White argues that Holmes, unlike Chafee and the
progressives, accepted a majoritarian conception of truth. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 435 (1993). See also Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Market-
place of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2004), for a sophisticated analysis of Justice Holmes
and the marketplace of ideas.
48. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).
49. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22–68 (David Bromwich & George Kate eds.,
Yale University Press 2003) (1859). See generally Lackland H. Bloom Jr., John Stuart Mill
and Political Correctness, 56 LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1 (2017).
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was familiar with both.50 Indeed, he had actually met Mill on a trip to
England.51 Like Mill, from whom he clearly borrowed, Holmes based the
search for truth/marketplace theory on the fact of human fallibility; that
is, we have learned from experience that our prior strongly held conclu-
sions (our “fighting faiths”) were sometimes incorrect and that free in-
terchange of ideas has permitted us to correct our errors.
In all of these opinions, particularly Abrams, Holmes failed to cite
readily available authority for his statements. In addition to failing to
credit Milton or Mill for the development of the search for truth justifica-
tion, Holmes declared that it “is the theory of our Constitution”52 with no
reference at all to text or original understanding. It was the “theory of
our Constitution” only to the extent that Holmes dissenting so declared.
The text of the First Amendment revealed nothing as to the underlying
theory of free speech. There was no useful evidence of either original
intent or understanding. Holmes did mention the repayment of the fines
assessed under the Sedition Act of 1798 as evidence that the common law
of seditious libel did not remain in effect.53 Even so, that does not speak
to the search for truth theory. There was no useful precedent. If there was
need for a theoretical justification for vigorous protection of free speech,
which there certainly was, Justice Holmes was on his own. In developing
free speech jurisprudence, the Court must, at least cautiously, attempt to
explain why speech matters. It is a mere rhetorical trope, however, to
suggest that such a constitutional theory already existed waiting to be
discovered. Holmes was quite obviously influenced by recent scholarship
by Professors Ernst Freund and Zechariah Chafee, however he did not
cite either.54
The Holmes dissent in Abrams was not the last word on free speech
theory, rather it was closer to the first. The search for truth has become
one of the three well recognized justifications for freedom of speech
along with the self-government theory and the liberty/autonomy theory,
neither of which Holmes mentioned in the Abrams dissent. Both were
introduced by Justice Brandeis in his notable concurrence in Whitney v.
California55 nine years later, which Holmes joined. Holmes contributed
one theory of free speech that has resonated ever since. The fact that he
did not say everything that could be said on the topic is hardly a fair
criticism. If a Justice or the Court constructs a theory of justification out
of thin air, as Holmes did in Abrams, there will be a duty to persuade the
future if the theory is to survive. Holmes succeeded with the search for
50. See Blasi, supra note 47, at 27–28 n.97, for a discussion of Mill’s influence on
Holmes.
51. HEALY, supra note 4, at 98.
52. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. See HEALEY, supra note 4, at 154–60 (noting Chafee’s influence); see also RAB-
BAN, supra note 17, at 296–97 (Holmes acknowledged that he had read Freund’s critique of
Debs but purported to be unaffected by it).
55. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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truth theory. It has its critics to be sure.56 And no single theory can ade-
quately explain all aspects of free speech that have been or should be
protected. Still the marketplace of ideas/search for truth has earned a se-
cure place in the First Amendment canon.
Another theme that Holmes hit in his Abrams dissent was the recogni-
tion that courts and everyone else often must proceed in the absence of
clear empirical guidance. He wrote that the theory of our Constitution “is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day,
we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imper-
fect knowledge.”57 This is consistent with Holmes’s general theories of
life, law, and government. Earlier in his career, Holmes made the famous
statement: “Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.”58 Here he was
essentially declaring that hard cases by definition have no easy answers
and that to a large extent courts must proceed on faith.
As with the earlier cases, Holmes’s dissent in Abrams recognized that
speech has the capacity to cause harm, although the record in Abrams, as
discussed by both the majority and dissent, suggests that the particular
speech at issue had no impact at all. Holmes did start his discussion by
conceding that the suppression of speech might be sensible if it was rec-
ognized as ineffective noise, as Holmes put it, “as when a man says he
that has squared the circle.”59 He then noted that time has upset many
“fighting faiths.”60 Presumably, speech played a role. It’s unclear whether
the upset of “many fighting faiths” is a good thing or a bad thing, but
surely it could be destabilizing and, in some instances, harmful. On the
other hand, Holmes seemed to suggest that this was the way by which
society progressively got closer to finding the truth which would certainly
be a positive. Holmes would permit suppression of speech only when it
“so imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.”61 Holmes conceded that speech can cause harm, however,
such harm must be tolerated in the absence of a dire emergency.
The brief Holmes dissent in Abrams is not heavy on doctrine, however,
Holmes does appear to have moved beyond clear and present danger,
which he never mentioned. His recognition that government interference
with speech is only warranted when the danger is imminent foreshad-
owed both the Brandeis Whitney concurrence and at least part of the se-
ditious speech test that ultimately prevailed in Brandenburg v. Ohio62
56. See FRED SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 19–30 (1982), for
criticism of the search for truth rationale.
57. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. United States v. N. Secs. Co., 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
59. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). The Court finally resolved the question of
when seditious speech may be criminally punished by declaring that “such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.” Id.
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fifty years later. Imminence seemed more demanding than clear and pre-
sent danger, which in turn seemed more demanding than bad tendency.
Holmes did not explain why imminence should be the threshold, however
Brandeis did nine years later in Whitney.63 For the past one hundred
years, scholars have debated whether in fact Holmes changed his doctri-
nal approach as of Abrams or whether he simply clarified his Schenck
approach.64 Assuming that Holmes had become more speech sensitive in
the nine month period between the first three cases and Abrams, did
Holmes’s thinking evolve on its own or was he influenced by his conver-
sations with Hand, the sharp critique by Zechariah Chafee and others,65
or the more disturbing focus of the 1918 amendment? Resolution is best
left to the historians with the caution that no one can say for certain.66 In
any event, the Abrams dissent became the official starting point for a
relatively libertarian approach to freedom of speech at least on the Su-
preme Court. However, it would take several decades for the Holmes
approach to become entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence.
The Holmes dissent did attempt to resolve another doctrinal issue.
There remained a question as to whether the English common law doc-
trine of seditious libel, that is criminalizing criticism of the government or
government officials, was consistent with the First Amendment. Holmes
argued that it had in fact been rejected when the government repaid the
fines of those convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Writ-
ing for a majority forty-five years later in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,67 Justice Brennan agreed, although he was simply picking up an
argument first raised by Holmes in his Abrams dissent.
The Abrams dissent also tells us much about effective opinion writing.
As with most Holmes classics, it is short, an approach that has grown out
of fashion as Justices seem to feel the need to cite every case and discuss
every doctrine and counter argument that might be applicable. One rea-
son that the Abrams dissent is still read is due to its rhetorical strength.68
Holmes made his case with images that capture the reader’s imagination.
He referred to the authoritarian who would “sweep away all opposition”
63. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis
argued that if the likelihood of lawless action was not yet imminent, then the proper re-
sponse was more speech, not suppression.
64. Chafee argued that the Holmes approach in Abrams was a logical progression
from Schenck. See CHAFEE, supra note 20, at 128–140. Rabban argues that Chafee deliber-
ately misconstrued clear and present danger as being far more speech protective than it
was intended to be. RABBAN, supra note 17, at 342–43, 346–55.
65. University of Chicago Law Professor Ernst Freund published a sharp attack on the
Holmes opinion in Debs in the May 3, 1919 edition of the New Republic entitled “The
Debs Case and Freedom of Speech.” See generally Freund, supra note 32. Holmes actually
drafted a letter to Herbert Croly, the editor of the New Republic, defending his Debs opin-
ion but declined to send it. HEALY, supra note 4, at 136–37 (reprinting the letter).
66. See WHITE, supra note 47, at 427–28, for the argument that criticism of Schenck,
Frohwerk, and especially the Debs opinions by people that Holmes respected had a
profound influence on his thinking about freedom of speech.
67. 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
68. G. Edward White notes that “Holmes the judge was often consumed by the sheer
attraction of language itself.” WHITE, supra note 47, at 444.
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perhaps like the poor sport who might overturn the chessboard when in
danger of checkmate.69 Likewise the upsetting of “many fighting faiths,”
whatever those might be, catches the reader’s attention. Finally, Holmes
made his case with the marketplace metaphor, perhaps because he had
recently read a biography of Adam Smith.70 As with Schenck, where the
fire in a theater example has been misquoted, Holmes’s opinion in
Abrams is often remembered for introducing the “marketplace of ideas,”
a phrase that Holmes implied but never actually wrote. Still the notion
that truth is better resolved by competition in the market than by govern-
ment fiat is easy to grasp. In the two sentences quoted above regarding
the nature of the judicial process, Holmes borrows words from science
(“experiment”), gambling (“wager”), and religion (“prophecy” and “sal-
vation”) to make his point.71 He chose language that evokes familiar
images in the reader’s mind. The discussion of free speech is conversa-
tional if not provisional. It is not turgid or legalistic. It could readily be
understood and appreciated by the general public. It was as if Holmes
was thinking out loud. Holmes showed how to write a memorable opin-
ion yet few follow his lead.
Another lesson of Abrams relates to the role of dissenting opinions.
Holmes became known as the great dissenter in no small part on account
of his dissent in Abrams, as well as Lochner v. New York72 and Northern
Securities Co. v. United States.73 Although some might question the utility
of dissent, Abrams is proof that it is sometimes effective.74 Both in terms
of doctrine as well as theory, the Holmes dissent eventually prevailed as
the Court explicitly admitted,75 however, it was not overnight. It took
decades but, to a large extent due to the strength of his argument, the
power of his rhetoric, the value of the Holmes reputation, and the persis-
tence of his disciples, especially in academia, the Holmes approach to free
speech prevailed and the majority’s approach was discarded. Quite apart
from the doctrinal tightening of the Abrams dissent, had Holmes done no
more than introduce the search for truth theory to free speech jurispru-
dence, the dissent would have been memorable.
The Abrams dissent also provides insight as to what may or may not
affect a Justice. It is known that Holmes did debate the proper approach
to free speech with Learned Hand at the time and he was aware of the
vigorous criticism of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs by Chafee who he
respected.76 Perhaps this influenced him. On the other hand, a personal
69. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
70. HEALY, supra note 4, at 205–06.
71. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
72. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1906) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
74. See MELVIN UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 169–71 (2015), for a
table of cases in which the Court cited or relied on the Abrams dissent.
75. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) (acknowledging that Holmes and
Brandeis were correct in the seditious speech cases of 1919 but then applying a diluted
version of clear and present danger).
76. HEALY, supra note 4, at 154–59.
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appeal by Justices in the majority fell on deaf ears. Several of the Justices
in the majority called on Holmes at his house to ask him not to publish
his dissent in Abrams in view of its controversial nature.77 At the time,
the Supreme Court did not have its own building nor did the Justices have
offices. Holmes politely declined. It is always a mystery as to what may or
may not influence a Justice, however, in Abrams, it is apparent that there
was a tug of war over the Holmes opinion.
Nineteen nineteen was a momentous year for the First Amendment,
perhaps the most momentous. It provides a microcosm of the Court, and
especially one great Justice struggling to come to grips with the meaning
of freedom of speech, a crucial though long ignored provision of the Bill
of Rights. In these cases Justice Holmes wrestled with both doctrine and
theory largely on a fresh slate with little guidance from the text, original
understanding, doctrine, or precedent. In the process Justice Holmes
seemed to make missteps and then attempted to correct his errors. Per-
haps more than most opinions, those from Schenck through Abrams give
us at least some insight into a great Justice’s mental process as he ap-
peared to think through the issues on paper. The cases of 1919, especially
the Abrams dissent, count because they provide a relatively clear starting
point for the judicial protection of freedom of speech, which blossomed
over the next 100 years. The Holmes dissent and the criticism that influ-
enced it also gave rise to significant legal and cultural change. The Espio-
nage Act of 1918 was repealed by Congress in 1920. President Coolidge
released all remaining prisoners convicted under the Acts in 1923 and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt later granted amnesty to all those con-
victed under the Alien and Sedition Acts.78 Moreover, in reaction to the
prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918, the
American Civil Liberties Union was founded with a primary dedication
to the protection of freedom of speech.
So what are the lessons of 1919? One obvious lesson is that in con-
fronting an important and novel legal issue, in those cases the meaning of
freedom of speech, it is fortunate to have a great Justice at the helm writ-
ing the opinions. Sometimes, as with freedom of speech in 1919, there is
little guidance in terms of text, original understanding, or precedent. The
Justices are truly on their own to decide the cases and to develop both
legal doctrine and supporting theory. That’s where Justice Holmes found
himself in 1919. In Schenck, he began to build free speech doctrine recog-
nizing that the First Amendment protected against subsequent punish-
ment as well as prior restraint. He also recognized that, since speech was
quite capable of causing public harm, protection must be contextual
rather than absolute and there must be a mechanism through which the
courts could accommodate important governmental interests such as suc-
cessfully prosecuting the war effort with freedom of speech. Justice
Holmes’s initial crack at developing such an accommodation was clear
77. Id. at 1–5, 213.
78. STONE, supra note 22, at 232.
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and present danger, which may or may not have been a restatement of
the bad tendency approach.
As of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, there was no attempt to explain
why freedom of speech mattered. That was provided by the iconic
Holmes dissent in Abrams. The introduction of the search for truth/mar-
ketplace of ideas justification, apparently borrowed from Mill, made a
lasting contribution to freedom of speech jurisprudence and remains one
of, if not the central, explanation for the importance of freedom of
speech. As explicated by Holmes ever so briefly, it is grounded in human
fallibility and assumes progressive enlightenment over time.
But quite beyond the doctrine and theory of Schenck and Abrams, the
1919 decisions reveal much about effective judicial decision-making and
opinion writing. Holmes was a great legal stylist. He was clearly writing
for a non-legalistic audience and writing for the future. His opinions were
short, accessible, conversational, and packed with understandable and
persuasive rhetorical devices. The opinions seem casually written and yet
it is obvious that a great deal of thought and effort went into them. The
reader is able to see Holmes mature as a free speech thinker over the
course of nine months in 1919. This is an exciting phenomenon to behold.
Abrams is a sterling example of the power of dissent to eventually pre-
vail. The Holmes dissent manages eventually, well after the Justice had
passed away, to sweep aside the then predominant “fighting faith” of bad
tendency. Schenck through Abrams illustrates the power of the intellectu-
ally engaged Justice. Rarely, if ever, has there been a Justice more intel-
lectually engaged than Justice Holmes. He did not write in isolation.
Instead, he debated the central issues before him with other great think-
ers of the day, including Learned Hand, and was keenly aware of the
critiques of his writing and thinking that were being published. Holmes
was not locked in an ivory tower isolated from the thinking public.
Rather, he was in the very heart of the storm, arguably a very difficult
place for a judge to reside.
